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Private environmental governance ("PEG") is not new asa practice, but, as an explicit academic pursuit, it is justbeginning. Every environmental externality internal-
ized (or not), every kilowatt of electricity used (or not), every
private decision that affects the natural environment or human
health is arguably a form of environmental governance. Poor
governance, perhaps, but governance nevertheless.
With this expansive concept, the practice of PEG can be
found in every private decision ever made with respect to
resource use and the environment. However, Garret Hardin's
Tragedy ofthe Commons in 1968 was one of the first works to
expressly describe the practical nature, and potential failures,
of private control over public resources.' Hardin did not,
however, express his ideas in the language of PEG.2 Likewise,
a generation later, in telling their stories of how communi-
ties can collectively, and without external government force,
manage natural resources, Elinor Ostrom and Robert Ellick-
son were not using the explicit framework of PEG.3
As a legal pursuit, the categorical study of PEG seems to
have begun in 2007, when Michael Vandenbergh described
how Wal-Mart's (and many other firms') supply-chain con-
tracting served a public environmental protection function.
* Visiting Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law;
Research Scholar, Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School, Lecturer, Yale
School of Forestry and Environmental Studies. I want to thank all
the student and faculty organizers of the 2017 JB. 6- Maurice C
Shapiro Environmental Law Symposium on Private Environmental
Governance at the George Washington University Law School, the
participants, for their wonderful contributions to this issue, and the
staff of the George Washington Journal of Energy and Environmental
Law for their hard work on this issue.
1. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy ofthe Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1245 (1968).
2. See id.
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TIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 1-2 (James E. Alt & Douglass C. North, eds.,
1990); Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among
Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 627 (1986).
4. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-MartEffict: The Role ofPrivate Contract-
ing in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REv. 913, 925-28 (2007) [hereinafter
Wal-Mart]. Again, the ideas of private environmental governance preexisted
this work, but the phrase-and therefore the field of study-can arguably be
traced to Vandenbergh. For example, the phrase was used in international rela-
tions literature prior to Vandenbergh's article. See, e.g., Robert Falkner, Private
Environmental Governance and International Relations: Exploring the Links, 3
GLOBAL ENVTL. PoLs. 72, 72 (2003); see also Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private
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environmental law.").
More recently, Vandenbergh's article Private Environmental
Governance has formally defined the field.' And though the
field and practice of PEG are still emerging, there is no argu-
ment that it is attracting the interest of scholars.
The 2017 J.B. & Maurice C. Shapiro Environmental Law
Symposium, from which this issue of the George Washing-
ton Journal of Energy and Environmental Law is collected, is
evidence of the new attention being paid to PEG. The pieces
you will read in this issue will address all aspects of this defi-
nition with great insight.
But before releasing you to these brilliant contributions, I
want to move away from PEG and instead consider the indi-
vidual parts, distinct from the explicit inquiries in the larger
field. Others have carefully defined "private environmental
governance."6 I want to look more closely at "private," "envi-
ronmental," and "governance" individually.
"Private"
Within the study of PEG, "private" describes the locus of
decision-making. Whereas modern environmental decision-
making is public, or governmental, here it is nongovern-
mental.7 But this public-private distinction is not the whole
definition of private. Private also denotes individuality in the
liberal tradition.'
Recognizing the centrality of individual liberty to the
concept of privacy blurs the public-private distinction and
complicates the notion of private governance. As John Dewey
has cautioned, when viewed as a matter of liberty, "private"
control has the same risks to individual autonomy as govern-
ment control.' Private liberty is a negative right and, as such,
it is largely irrelevant whether the negative right is against
a government, a neighbor, a corporation, or a coalition of
benevolent corporations. Judge Evelyn Keyes has written that
negative liberty is the concept "that people have private lives
in which they are free to make their own moral decisions
without the imposition upon them of society's moral point of
view.""o The idea of "private" in classic liberalism is the idea
of personhood; it is the idea that certain rights are no more
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There are contemporary and classic liberal responses to
this idea of "private." The contemporary response is that indi-
vidual choices as expressed by market transactions, or lack
thereof, are the levers of individual power with which pri-
vate autonomy is protected from nongovernmental infringe-
ment." The classic liberal response is that the common law
of contract, property, and tort are private actions to defend
private rights against nongovernmental infringement.12
Funneling these issues back into the context of PEG,
there are two points for further consideration. First, if mar-
ket transactions serve as checks to protect private autonomy
from nongovernmental control, does the fact that only
aggregate market signals will catalyze PEG actually provide
protection on the individual level? If we regard the idea of
private as merely nongovernmental, aggregate market signals
seem like an effective way to drive corporate behavior. If we
regard the idea of private as one of individuality and negative
liberty, then aggregate market signals, reflections (at least
arguably) of society's preferences, may not provide sufficient
individual authority.
The second point is that the classical check on private
control, the common law, has a diminished role in PEG.
While corporate parties to green supply-chain contracts, for
instance, may bring common law suits for breach, individu-
als outside of these transactions, but within the environment,
are given relatively little autonomy. Suits for misleading
advertising,1 3 nuisance,14 and dignitary affronts," have had
little success in the PEG context, leaving private individu-
als with limited checks against potentially insufficient private
governance. Citizen suits under the major federal environ-
mental statutes create invaluable individual empowerment,
of course, but these do nothing to enforce the terms of non-
regulatory private promises.
The notion of "private" in PEG is cabined, a one-dimen-
sional notion. It is particularly nongovernmental, but it does
not reflect the importance of individual empowerment. This
is no existential flaw of PEG; rather, it is a call for additional
work by scholars and advocates to promote a vision of PEG
that better empowers individuals.
"Environmental"
There is a broad trend within the environmental movement"6
and environmental sciences17 to better promote and under-
11. See, e.g., David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neolib-
eralism, 77 LAw & CoNrMP. PROBs. 1, 6 (2014).
12. See, e.g., Liberalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Online Edition 2018)
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/ [https://perma.cc/B5J2-H6BE].
13. Eg., Lateef v. Pharmavite LLC, No. 12-C-5611, 2013 WL 1499029, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 2013).
14. Eg., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 415 (2011).
15. Melissa Mortazavi, TAINTED: Fooe4 Identity and the Search for Dignitary Re-
dress, 81 BROOK. L. REv. 1463, 1469-70 (2016).
16. See, e.g., About Us: Vision and Mission, THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, https://
www.nature.org/about-us/vision-mission/index.htm?intc=nature.tnav.about
[https://perma.cclXW9J-DUYW] (last visited Aug. 22, 2017) ("Our vision is
a world where the diversity of life thrives, and people act o conserve nature for
its own sake and its ability to fulfill our needs and enrich our lives.").
17. OSwALT J. SCHMITZ, THE NEW ECOIOGY: RETHINKING A SCIENCE FOR THE
ANTHROPOCENE, 6 (2017).
stand the reality that "environment" is not merely something
outside of humanity but is, indeed closely and inextricably,
intertwined with humanity. In After Nature, Jed Purdy elo-
quently traces the dynamic history of the human perception
of nature; but, even within that dynamism, Purdy paints a
picture of a somewhat consistent view over most of the twen-
tieth century." Purdy describes the consistent view of nature
as a thing outside of human systems and needing protection
from humans." In 1995, historian William Cronon offered
one of the most provocative and persuasive arguments against
this human-environment dichotomy in his essay, The Trouble
with Wilderness; Or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature.20 Pro-
fessor Cronon's basic challenge was that a distant, distinct
environment (specifically, the ideal of wilderness), is a fantasy
if the ideal is a "tabula rasa that supposedly existed before we
began to leave our marks on the world."2 1
Over time, other thinkers have morphed Cronon's critique
of the human-nature divide into an even more provocative
promise of a technological panacea in which we can leverage
human ingenuity to create a firewall between a productive
human realm and a merely aesthetic environmental one.22
For instance, the Ecomodernist Manifesto offers an unex-
pected take on the nature of the environment.23 Like Cronon,
the Manifesto's authors understand-to a degree-the indi-
visibility of humans and the environment. They draw an
essential ink between human well-being and environmental
resources, and that link endures in human industry as much
as in the human romance with nature.24 The Ecomodernists
remind us that commerce (including food, energy, and settle-
ment), demand the use of environmental resources.25 Herein
is the modern conceit: that we cannot idealize the environ-
ment as an "other" because it is central to our survival.
Ecomodernism promises that as a mere necessity, we
can discharge our environmental responsibility by largely
"decoupling" our human systems from environmental ones,
leaving only the essential connection that will transport
environmental resources into human systems.26 "Intensify-
ing many human activities . . . so that they use less land and
interfere less with the natural world," explain the Econom-
dernists, "is the key to decoupling human development from
environmental impacts."27 In this view, "environment" is
not distinct, but if we work hard enough-if we have suf-
ficient technological savvy-then perhaps we can exorcize
"environment" from our human requirements. This new dis-
18. JEDEDIAH PURDY, AFTER NATURE: A POLITICS FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE
(2015).
19. See id at 3-14.
20. William Cronon, The Trouble With Wilderness; Or, Getting Back to the Wrong
Nature, in UNCOMMON GROUND: RETHINKING THE HUMAN PLACE IN NATURE
69, 69 (William Cronon, ed., 1995) [hereinafter The Trouble With Wilderness].
21. Id at 80.
22. Id. at 81-82.
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tinction-this decoupling-unlike the idealized wilderness
Cronon challenged, would not be imagined. It would be real.
Cronon's solution is quite different from that of the
Ecomodernists. Cronon tells us that the reality of environ-
mental ubiquity demands direct engagement and undy-
ing responsibility.28 It means that we can never "flee into a
mythical wilderness to escape history and the obligation to
take responsibility for our own actions."29 To the extent we
"pretend" wilderness is our "real home,"0 "we give ourselves
permission to evade responsibility for the lives we actually
lead."" Thus, in criticizing the fallacy of wilderness and
the human-environment divide, Cronon's realism demands
more, not less, responsibility for all our choices because our
choices "at home" are no less environmental choices than our
choices in the "environment."32
In the context of PEG, there is an awkward balance
between the modernist promise of innovation, demands for
personal responsibility, and the importance of a ubiquitous
environment. PEG is, after all, the study of innovations in
governance. It is about developing new tools for limiting
harms, expressing good behaviors, and capitalizing on con-
sumer preference. To that end, it embraces the modernist
promise. Likewise, though PEG may exclude robust individ-
ual participation, in relying on consumer behavior, it provides
an environmental protection tool (shopping) for many who
believed they otherwise had none. It is environmental ubiq-
uity, however, that offers what might be the most philosophi-
cally interesting question. Accepting that the environment is
not an "other," but is in fact part of every human system,
provides the bridge to making commerce an environmental
issue as much as species conservation or pollution control.
Although it creates a newly accessible environmental pro-
tection tool, a downside of treating "environmental" as a part
of commerce as much as it is part of wilderness, is that this
sameness could make it easier to evade environmental respon-
sibility. An accessible, omnipresent, and critical environment
should demand constant attention and care, while an accessi-
ble, omnipresent, and simple tool may allow us to take "envi-
ronmental" for granted as part of our shopping habits.
"Governance"
If commercial behavior is environmental behavior, then PEG
is not necessarily environmental "governance"-it is simply
commercial or economic decision-making that considers a
new variable: the environment.
In his 2007 article, Professor Vandenbergh defined gov-
ernance exactly as I would, by saying it is a restriction on
behavior.33 This simple definition leaves room for the grow-
ing explorations of governance that have dotted the literature
of the legal and sociological fields as well as that of politi-
28. The Trouble With Wilderness, supra note 20, at 88-89.
29. See id at 90.
30. Id. at 81.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 89-90.
33. Wal-Mart, supra note 4, at 916.
cal science, without overly complicating the basic notion of
restrictions and limits as central to "governance."
These limits can arise from a number of sources, chief
among them public law, private law, and community norms.
Public law is the area most familiar to environmental schol-
ars and practitioners.3 4 This is the positive law that legisla-
tive bodies establish through statutes and regulators establish
through administrative rules. There is no question that these
public, positive laws restrict environmental choices in a num-
ber of ways, thereby governing environmental behavior." Pri-
vate law restricts the field of private interactions.6 Private law
includes the law of contract that restricts the way two parties
may bargain, or the law of torts that establishes liability for
a variety of noncontractual wrongdoings. Although mostly
retrospective, private law restricts behavior through injunc-
tion or, more typically, the payment of damages. Community
norms are the most exotic to legal scholars, though they are
hardly unknown.3 7 Norms are informal expectations among
a community and although they do not carry the penal or
pecuniary threats of positive, governmental laws, they can
restrict behavior based on "complex continuing relation-
ships" in a given community.38 All three of these mechanisms
are governance mechanisms because they restrict behaviors.
The restrictions take different forms, from legal penalties and
fines to damaged social relations. In most cases, a blend of
norms and positive laws will interact to restrict behavior.3 9
In the context of PEG, it is important to understand and
untangle the source of restrictions. Certainly, the contractual
relationships that shape supply chain sustainability, or the
norm-based relationships that, at a minimum, animate coop-
erative labeling programs, restrict environmental behavior. A
contract may require greenhouse gas reporting, for instance,
or an eco-label program may restrict the number of producers
from which a retailer can purchase. Professor Vandenbergh
writes that in PEG, "[e]nforcement occurs through shaming,
boycotts, private inspections, contract terminations or nonre-
newals, and preferential purchasing"'0 Accurate though it is,
this conflates the sources of pressure on specific PEG activi-
ties and the pressures to engage in PEG in the first place.
In the first instance, shaming and boycotts could pressure a
company to engage in PEG. In the second instance, private
inspections, contract terminations, and preferential purchas-
ing enforce existing PEG commitments.
Understanding how to govern existing PEG programs is
an important and informative area of scholarship that will
improve the effectiveness of existing PEG efforts.41 But it is
equally interesting, and more important for widespread PEG
engagement, that we understand what governs entrance into
PEG in the first place. The answer to this question seems to
34. See Private Environmental Governance, supra note 4, at 130-31.
35. Id.
36. Id at 130-34.
37. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 3, at 624.
38. Id. at 628.
39. Id. at 667-68.
40. Private Environmental Governance, supra note 4, at 137.
41. See, e.g., Light & Orts, supra note 6, at 9-10.
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fit into two categories: profit and personality.42 Marketing,
consumer demand, and regulatory avoidance are all driv-
ers of entrance into PEG that find their genesis in the profit
motive. Corporate culture, or the culture of top manage-
ment, is rooted in self-identity and personality.
Some, like me, might have the instinct to say that, although
profit and personality are valid and important drivers of PEG
engagement, they are not "governance" in the same way that
positive law or norms are governance. The clear mandate of
positive laws, or the rich complexity of norms which, when
ignored, can produce meaningful consequences, might give
rise to this instinct. But economic incentives, though strictly
voluntary, certainly can have a similar impact to norm-based
incentives, and therefore govern in a similarly meaningful way.
The certainty that economic incentives are "governance"1
rather than volunteerism, however, erodes when paired with
the sway of corporate culture. The profit motive is a pow-
erful one, and no doubt that motive controls and restricts
corporate behavior to a real degree. But corporate person-
ality is also a driver. It is more difficult to say that corpo-
rate culture or personality is strictly "governance" because
it is a wholly internal proposition, one that does not restrict
behavior because it is, in an important sense, the thing that
other governance mechanisms seek to control. If corporate
personality is an influential driver of PEG engagement-that
is, if personality can tip the balance-then profit seems like
a far weaker form of governance than law and norms. The
weakness of profit as a form of "governance" means that PEG
advocates, and perhaps scholars as well, need to strengthen
the profit argument quantitatively, and qualitatively need to
better understand, and build, virtuous corporate cultures.
PEG spans a range of issues much wider than this brief
survey of "private," "environmental," and "governance" sug-
gests. What this survey might nevertheless illustrate is that,
with respect to all three titular words, PEG is less than
the sum of its parts. "Private," in the liberal sense, is much
broader than the simple nongovernmental meaning that
PEG ascribes. "Environmental," with all the debate around
its place in our physical and emotional systems, is, within
PEG, merely about commerce: its role is in our economic sys-
tem. "Governance," which demands restrictions and control,
typically by external mechanisms, applies to market-driven
behaviors that motivate PEG; but this external governance
is weakened by the power of internal personalities that may
advance or restrain productive PEG engagement. In the con-
text of PEG, each word is asked to carry much less weight
than it would carry in other settings.
42. See Karen Bradshaw Schulz, New Governance and Industry Culture, 88 NoTRE
DAME L. REv. 2515, 2521 (2015) (identifying brand development, corporate
culture, customer demand, and regulatory avoidance as key drivers of socially
responsible corporate activities).
None of this analysis should devalue the importance of
PEG in any way. Rather, if we allow the individual words
to shoulder the full burden of their broader meanings, this
analysis is a start to make PEG an even more robust field
of practice and research than it already is. And it is indeed
robust. The contributions to this issue shine light on some of
the particular and existential spaces still in the PEG shadows.
Looking specifically at the role of institutional investors,
Lisa Benjamin manages to cover all three titular words in
some detail. Her contribution details the risks and opportu-
nities that climate change presents to institutional investors
in the wake of the 2015 Paris Agreement, specifically with
respect to voluntary, nonstate participation."
Sarah J. Morath tackles "environmental" by identifying
the growing trend of private animal welfare commitments.
Professor Morath applies PEG's framework to corporate ani-
mal welfare efforts to uncover the various motivations as well
as the impacts of these new animal welfare strategies."
Albert Lin further explores the boundaries of "private" in
his piece about Pope Francis' Encyclical, Laudato Si', as a
form of PEG. Just as Professor Morath applied the framework
of PEG to an area not always considered "environment," Lin
applies the framework to an area not always, or not tradition-
ally, considered "private."'
Kristen van de Biezenboz adds more nuance to the nature
of "governance" as merely voluntary in PEG, offering an
innovation in enforceability and accountability. She pro-
poses a strategy for making PEG more effective by combin-
ing large-scale schemes, such as the Carbon Principles, with
small-scale schemes, such as Good Neighbor and Commu-
nity Benefit agreements."
My own contribution, an edited version of my talk at the
Symposium,47 focuses on how to maintain the best aspects of
public "governance" as we shift to more "private" leadership.
I ask what the role of private non-profit advocacy groups
should be in PEG."
The diverse contributions to this symposium issue are case-
in-point that PEG is more than meets the eye, though maybe
less than "private," "environmental," and "governance" on
their own. This two-sided complexity assures that while there
is still work to be done, and still practical and philosophical
puzzles to solve within the new field, PEG is here to stay.
43. Lisa Benjamin, Institutional Investors in the UK and "Carbon-Major" Compa-
nies: Private Environmental Governance Post-Paris, 9 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY &
ENvTL. L. 5 (2018).
44. Sarah J. Morath, Private Governance andAnimal Welfare, 9 GEO. WASH. J. EN-
ERGY & ENvTL. L. 21 (2018).
45. Albert Lin, Pope Francis'Encyclical on the Environment as Private Environmental
Governance, 9 GEo. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 33 (2018).
46. Kristen van de Biezenbos, Enforcing Private Environmental Governance Stan-
dards Through Community Contracts, 9 GEo. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 45
(2018).
47. This talk itself is drawn from the following article: Joshua U. Galperin, Trust
Me, I'm a Pragmatist: A Partially Pragmatic Critique of Pragmatic Activism, 42
COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 425 (2017).
48. Joshua U. Galperin, Pragmatism, Pragtivism, and Private Environmental Gover-
nance, 9 GEo. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 50 (2018).
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